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Childbearing Age, Family Allowances, and
Social Security
Pierre Pestieau* and Gregory Ponthiere{
Although the optimal public policy under an endogenous number of children has been widely
studied, the optimal public intervention under an endogenous timing of births has remained
largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy when the timing of births is
chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility weakens future earnings. We analyze
the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under
distinct informational environments. Endogenous childbearing ages is shown to affect the
optimal policy through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization
of fertility externalities. Contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated
according to the age of parents can be part of the optimal family policy. Our results are
robust to introducing: (i) children as durable ‘‘goods’’; (ii) education choices; (iii) varying total
fertility.
JEL Classification: J13, D10, H21, H55
1. Introduction
As is well known among demographers, there has been a continuous postponement of
fertility in European economies since the late 1970s. That strong demographic trend is well
illustrated by the case of France. As shown in Figure 1, the average age at motherhood has
increased from about 26.9 years in 1977 to about 29.7 years in 2005. The postponement of
fertility appears even more strongly when we look at the mode of the distribution of the age at
motherhood: The mode age has grown from 25 years in 1977 to 29 years today. With the
development of assisted reproductive technologies, that evolution is likely to be sustained—if
not reinforced—in the future.
The tendency toward a postponement of births is a widespread phenomenon, which can be
observed in many economies around the world. To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows, for France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the decomposition of the
average total fertility rate between the number of children born during the early part of the
reproduction period (i.e., when women are between 15 and 34 years old) and the number of
children born during the late part of the reproduction period (i.e., when women are between 35
and 49 years old).1 During the period 1985–2005, the proportion of children from mothers
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older than 34 years within the total number of children has been continuously increasing in all
economies under study. Hence, we observe an unambiguous rise in the proportion of what we
can call ‘‘late births’’ (i.e., children born from older parents), in comparison to what we can call
‘‘early births’’ (i.e., children born from younger parents).
The causes of the postponement of fertility have been widely explored.2 Empirical studies
highlighted that women’s earnings opportunities and educational achievements are a major
determinant of fertility behavior. The rise in women’s wages, by implying a higher opportunity
cost of motherhood, appears to be a major factor of fertility decline, which coincides also with
later motherhood.3
Besides those empirical studies, theoretical models have also been developed to explain the
choice of a particular fertility age pattern over the lifecycle. Those models, such as Happel, Hill, and
Low (1984), Cigno and Ermisch (1989), and Cigno (1991), highlighted the central influence of
lifecycle effects on the timing of births. Whereas Happel, Hill, and Low (1984) emphasized that the
Figure 2. Decomposition of the total fertility rate (before and after 35 years), 1985–2005. Source: UNDP (2012)
2 See Gustafsson (2001) for a survey on the literature on childbearing age.
3 Empirical studies include Schultz (1985), Heckman and Walker (1990), and Tasiran (1995) on Sweden, Ermisch and
Ogawa (1994) on Japan, Merrigan and St Pierre (1998) on Canada, and Joshi (2002) on Great Britain.
Figure 1. Age at motherhood in France. Source: INED (2011)
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consumption smoothing induced by the maximization of lifetime welfare may lead to delaying births,
Cigno and Ermisch (1989) focused on the shape of the earnings profile induced by human capital
investment and argued that steeper earnings profiles lead to the postponement of births later in life.4
The various influences of governments on the timing of births have also been studied.
While the income tax rate and parental leave benefits reduce the opportunity cost of early
children, children allowances reduce the net direct expenditures, and the income tax rate also
reduces the forgone returns to forgone human capital investment. Those governmental
influences have been confirmed by various empirical studies.5 Macroeconometric studies, such
as Ermisch (1988) on the United Kingdom and Walker (1995) on Sweden, identified a positive
impact of child allowances on early motherhood. That effect was confirmed by microecono-
metric studies, such as Laroque and Salanie´ (2004) on France, who found that cash benefits
increase the probability of having a first child.
In the light of those influences of governments on fertility behavior, a natural question to
raise concerns the optimal design of family policies. What should governments do in front of
the postponement of fertility? Should governments implement a transfer policy in such a way as
to reinforce (or weaken) that demographic trend? Should governments subsidize births
differently depending on the age of parents? By which channels are the optimal fertility policy
and the optimal pension policy related to each other?
The literature on the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has examined various aspects
of the problem, but without paying attention to the optimal timing of births. Cigno (1986) showed
that family allowances aimed at reducing child poverty may, by raising fertility, have quite the
opposite effects, so that the optimal policy may consist in taxing—instead of subsidizing—the
number of children.6 More recently, Cremer, Gahvari, and Pestieau (2006) studied the design of the
optimal pension system under endogenous and stochastic fertility, and showed that, under positive
fertility externalities, one should grant parents who have more children larger pension benefits.7
The goal of this article is to complement that literature, by examining the design of the
optimal public intervention in a context where the timing of births is chosen by parents. For
that purpose, we develop a three-period model. In the first two periods, individuals are active,
and they can have children. In the third period, individuals retire. In that framework, having a
child in the first period relative to the second is cheaper, but it imposes a cost in terms of
professional achievement, so that some trade-off exists between lower fertility costs and higher
future wages. Moreover, when parents retire, and rely on some help from their children, they
will, if earnings increase with age, receive fewer resources per child under late childbearing than
under early childbearing. Retired agents will also benefit from the contributions of fewer
individuals under late childbearing than under early childbearing (where they benefit from the
contributions of their working children and grandchildren). Finally, in order to account for the
widely observed effect of heterogeneity in education on the timing of births (Cigno and Ermisch
1989), we assume that agents differ in the level and the slope of their earnings profile, as well as
in the extent to which future earnings are decreasing in the number of early children.
4 Cigno and Ermisch (1989) also found, on the basis of U.K. data, empirical support for that explanation of the observed
heterogeneity in terms of fertility patterns.
5 On this, see the survey by Gauthier (2007).
6 This was confirmed by Balestrino, Cigno, and Pettini (2002) in a model where households differ in their productivities
and in their ability to raise children.
7 That result is also obtained in Cremer, Gahvari, and Pestieau (2008), who examined the optimal pension scheme when
fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children.
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In the following, we make, for the sake of presentation, several simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume, in the baseline model, that the total number of children over the whole
reproduction period is equal to the replacement fertility level, in such a way as to focus only on
the timing of births.8 Second, we abstract here from intrafamily decision-making issues and
treat a couple as a single individual capable of working, saving, and having children. Third, we
assume away the childhood period. Fourth, we focus on a static overlapping-generations model
and do not explore here the effects of childbearing ages on the long-run dynamics.9 Fifth, we
assume here that the number of children is deterministic, and thus rule out uncertainty about
the number of children.10 Sixth, we do not consider investment in the quality of children and
the impact of birth spacing on this.11
Anticipating our results, we first show that, at the laissez-faire, agents with low earnings
tend, under general conditions, to have children earlier than agents with high earnings. Then,
we characterize the first-best utilitarian social optimum and show that this can be
decentralized by means of lump-sum transfers from agents with high earnings toward agents
with low earnings, but leave fertility profiles unchanged. Then, we consider the second-best
optimal policy under linear taxation instruments and show that the optimal family allowances
are positive only if subsidizing children favors early childbearing. Those family allowances are
here justified on redistributive grounds, that is, as a way to achieve indirect redistribution
toward low-earnings agents, who tend to favor early births. The study of the second-best
problem under nonlinear instruments shows that children allowances should concern only the
children of young parents, in such a way as to solve the incentive problem. We also examine
the optimal family policy under the presence of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system
and show that the social planner faces, under endogenous childbearing age, a trade-off
between efficiency (favoring late childbearing) and equity (helping early childbearing).
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative settings, including parental
preferences treating children as durable consumption goods, the introduction of parental
education decisions, and the addition of a third working period, as well as relaxing the
replacement fertility assumption. Our results are shown to be qualitatively robust to those
changes.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. The
first-best utilitarian optimum is derived in section 3, where its decentralization is also examined.
In section 4, we characterize the optimal child benefits when there is a perfect capital market. In
section 5, we introduce the idea that pensions can be of the PAYG type, which may give an
incentive to both the government and individuals to have early children. Several extensions are
studied in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
8 That assumption is relaxed later, in section 6.
9 Those effects are discussed in Pestieau and Ponthiere (2013), where it is shown that, compared to the two-period OLG
model, the conditions for optimal capital accumulation and optimal fertility differ quite significantly under varying
childbearing ages. However, Samuelson’s (1975) Serendipity Theorem still holds in that broader demographic
environment. On the dynamics, see also DA´lbis, Augeraud-Ve´ron, and Schubert (2010) on the continuous-time OLG
setup.
10 See Cigno and Luporini (2011) on the optimal family policy when the number and the future earnings of children are
random. The absence of risk rules out a case for early childbearing: the possibility to insure oneself against a total
number of children lower than desired.
11 On that issue, see Schultz (1997).
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2. Basic Model
Environment
Whereas reproduction can, in reality, occur at various points in the lifetime, we will focus
here, for the sake of simplicity, on a three-period model with two reproduction periods.12 The
three life periods are labeled a, ‘, and o (i.e., advanced, late, old). In the first two periods,
individuals work, consume, save, and have children. It is assumed that a perfect capital market
exists. In the last period, individuals are retired and consume the proceeds of their savings.
The specificity of the model lies in the existence of two, instead of one, periods at which
parents can give birth to children. The number of early births is denoted by na, whereas the
number of late births is denoted by n‘. As we are concerned with the timing of fertility rather
than with the level of total fertility, we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that total fertility is
fixed to its replacement level, which is, in the absence of mortality, equal to 1: nazn‘~1.
13
When considering the optimal fertility timing, an important issue consists of the cost
imposed by early fertility on future career and earnings opportunities. Young childbearing ages
make career progression more difficult. In order to capture this, we assume that all individuals
have, at period 2, a productivity that is larger than in period 1, to an extent that is decreasing in
the number of children they had in period 1. Hence, while first-period earnings is equal to w,
second-period earnings is equal to wh(na), where the function h nað Þw1 accounts for the extra





(na)v0. This reflects the idea that early childbearing has a cost on earnings in period ‘.14
Indeed, various empirical studies, such as Joshi (1990, 1998) on Great Britain and Dankmeyer
(1996) on the Netherlands, show that having children in an early stage of a career slows down
human capital accumulation and professional promotion.15
To do justice to the observed heterogeneity in terms of career and childbearing ages, we
assume that individuals differ in the shape of the earnings profile, that is, in the function h nað Þ.
We consider two types of agents:16
N Type-1 agents: low earnings profile, with h1 naið Þvh2 naið Þ and h01 naið Þ
 v h02 naið Þ  for an
equal nai.
N Type-2 agents: high earnings profile, with h2 naið Þwh1 naið Þ and h02 naið Þ
 w h01 naið Þ  for an
equal nai.
The earnings profile of type-2 agents lies above the one of type-1 agents for an equal level
of early births. Moreover, the earnings profile of type-2 agents is more sensitive to early fertility
than the one of type-1 agents.
The lifetime welfare of an individual of type i[f1,2g is expressed as
Ui~u cið Þzbu dið Þzb2u bið Þzv naizn‘ið Þ ð1Þ
12 Adding more periods to the model would not bring additional insights or results.
13 That assumption is relaxed in section 6.
14 Note that late births can also have a negative impact on earnings. The consequences of that additional effect are
discussed in section 6.
15 The causes of the influence of early childbearing are unknown. For instance, Ermisch and Pevalin (2005) showed that
very early births worsen later outcomes on the marriage market.
16 This is a reduced form model of an economy where agents differ in career profiles, due to past education choices.
Section 6 studies how adding an education choice affects our results.
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where ci, di, and bi are consumption, u :ð Þ is strictly concave, b is a time preference factor
(0ƒbƒ1), and v :ð Þ is the utility for early and late children, which is also strictly concave.17
Substituting for naizn‘i~1 and normalizing the utility from children, in such a way that
v 1ð Þ~0, lifetime welfare can be rewritten as18
Ui~u cið Þzbu dið Þzb2u(bi) ð2Þ




In the second period, the individual earns also savings income Rsai, where R is the interest
factor. He saves also s‘i for the old age and spends e‘ 1{naið Þ as cost of raising his n‘i~1{nai
late children. The direct cost of children is larger for late children than for early children:
e‘wea
That assumption is in conformity with the medical literature showing the larger costs of late
motherhood in comparison to the ones under early motherhood. Those additional costs are of
various kinds and concern both the mother and the child (see Gilbert, Nesbitt, and Danielsen
1999; Gustafsson 2001).20 We assume, for simplicity, that the parents face the entire additional
cost from late childbearing. Hence, second-period consumption is
di~whi naið ÞzRsai{s‘i{ 1{naið Þe‘: ð4Þ
In the third period, an agent of type i [f1,2g consumes the proceeds of his savings:
bi~Rs‘i: ð5Þ
Laissez-faire
Each agent of type i [f1,2g chooses first-, second-, and third-period consumptions, as well
as first- and second-period children, in such a way as to maximize his lifetime welfare subject to














17 We assume here a perfect substitutability, in welfare terms, between early and late children. That assumption, which is
made for simplicity, amounts to assuming that children are not durable consumption goods. That assumption is
relaxed in section 6.
18 v(?) will be used below in section 6, where we assume variable overall fertility.
19 For the sake of simplicity, we abstract here from the time cost of children and assume only a physical cost for each
child. Note, however, that some additional costs, which could be called ‘‘career’’ costs, are associated with early
parenthood (see below).
20 According to Gustafsson (2001), late births imply, on average, more pregnancy complications, more ceasareans, and
more breast cancer for mothers. Moreover, late children are also more subject to somatic and learning problems.
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The first equalities, which describe the optimal consumption profile, are standard. However,
the second condition, which characterizes the optimal timing for births, is not straightforward.
It tells us that the allocation of births along the lifecycle is optimal when there is an equalization
of the marginal welfare loss from varying the number of early children (the left-hand side
[LHS]) with the marginal welfare gain from varying the number of early children (the right-
hand side [RHS]). The marginal welfare loss from early births has two components: It reduces
consumption at the young age (first term of the LHS) and reduces future earnings possibilities
(second term of the LHS). But having children early in the career has nonetheless the advantage
of avoiding late fertility, which is more expensive, since e‘wea (see the RHS).
To interpret those conditions, let us assume that b~R~1: Then we have a perfect
consumption smoothing for all agents: ci~di~bi, with higher consumptions for type-2 agents,
who have a higher earnings profile.




Hence, for an agent of type i, three possible cases can arise, depending on the size of the
cost differential between early and late children and on the impact of early parenthood on
future productivity:
Case 1 If {wh
0
i 0ð Þve‘{ea and {wh
0
i 1ð Þwe‘{ea for type i, then 0vnaiv1 and
0vn‘i~1{naiv1.21
Case 2 If {wh
0
i 0ð Þwe‘{ea for type i, then nai~0 and n‘i~1.
Case 3 If {wh
0
i 1ð Þve‘{ea for type i, then nai~1 and n‘i~0.
If the cost differential between late and early births e‘{ea is very low, so that the marginal
gain from early childbearing is inferior to the marginal loss from early children for any nai, then
type-i agents have no early children, and only late children, since this will preserve their future
productivity at little additional child costs (Case 2). If, on the contrary, the cost differential
e‘{ea is extremely large, so that the marginal gain from early childbearing is superior to the
marginal loss from early children for any nai (Case 3), type-i agents opt for early children only.
In the intermediate case (Case 1), there is an interior solution with naiw0 and n‘iw0, with a
shape of fertility profile that depends on how sensitive the earnings profile is to early
parenthood.
Let us now compare type-1 and type-2 agents. Six distinct cases can arise:
Case 1-1 If {wh
0
i 0ð Þve‘{ea and {wh
0
i 1ð Þwe‘{ea is true for all agents, then all types are in
Case 1: 0vna2vna1v1 and 0vn‘1vn‘2v1.22
Case 1-2 If {wh
0
1 0ð Þve‘{ea and{wh
0
1 1ð Þwe‘{ea and{wh
0
2 0ð Þwe‘{ea, type-1 is in Case 1,
and type-2 in Case 2: 0vna2vna1 and 0vn‘1vn‘2~1.
Case 2-2 If {wh
0
1 0ð Þwe‘{ea, then both types are in the Case 2: na1~na2~0 and n‘i~n‘2~1.
Case 3-1 If {wh
0
1 1ð Þve‘{ea and {wh
0
2 0ð Þve‘{ea and {wh
0
2 1ð Þwe‘{ea, then type-1 is in
Case 3, and type-2 is in Case 1: 0vna2vna1~1 and n‘1~0vn‘2v1.
21 To see this, note that, under the above conditions, there exists, by monotonicity and continuity of hi(nai), a unique
level of nai satisfying e‘{ea~{wh
0
i naið Þ.
22 Indeed, the interior levels of na1 and na2 satisfy respectively: e‘{ea~{wh
0
1 na1ð Þ and e‘{ea~{wh
0




 v h02 naið Þ  for any 0ƒnaiƒ1, the LHS is, for an equal nai, larger in the case of type 2, leading to na2vna1.
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Case 3-2 If {wh
0
1 1ð Þve‘{ea and {wh
0
2 0ð Þwe‘{ea, then type-1 is in Case 3, and type-2 is in
Case 2: na2~0vna1~1 and n‘1~0vn‘2~1.
Case 3-3 If {wh
0
2 1ð Þve‘{ea, then both types are in the Case 3: na1~na2~1 and n‘i~n‘2~0.
Whatever the case, the number of early children among type-1 parents is never inferior to
the number of early children among type-2 parents. Inversely, type-2 parents never have fewer
late children than type-1 parents. Moreover, under general conditions (excluding cases 2-2 and
3-3), type-1 agents have more early children and fewer late children than type-2 parents.
Therefore, our baseline model, although simple, allows us to rationalize the observed
heterogeneity within the population. Empirical studies (Cigno and Ermisch 1989; Ermisch and
Ogawa 1995; Joshi 2002) show that adults with lower career opportunities have, on average,
their children earlier than adults with (potentially) steeper earnings profiles. This is clearly the
case in our model, where, if one excludes cases 2-2 and 3-3, type-2 parents have their children,
on average, at ages that exceed the childbearing ages for type-1 agents.
Our model can also explain the observed postponement of fertility. Indeed, with the
development of assisted reproductive technologies, the cost gap e‘{ea has been reduced. When
the gap e‘{ea goes down, Case 3 becomes less likely for all agents. Moreover, a reduction of
e‘{ea also favors, for all agents, a transition from Case 1 to Case 2. All this leads to a rise in the
average age at motherhood, as shown by the data.
3. The First-Best Problem
Let us now characterize the social optimum of our economy. For that purpose, we will
focus on a classical utilitarian social objective, whose goal coincides with the maximization of
aggregate welfare. We also focus here on the aggregate welfare of a single cohort of individuals,
which includes a fixed fraction p1 of agents of type 1, and a fixed fraction p2 of agents of type
2.23 Whereas focusing on a single cohort of given size is an obvious simplification, this allows us
to escape from well-known difficulties raised by population ethics.24
The first-best optimum is obtained by maximizing the following Lagrangian:X
pi Ui{m cizdizbiznaieaz 1{naið Þe‘{w 1zhi naið Þð Þ½ ð Þ
where m denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint of the
economy. The FOCs are
u
0




The utilitarian social optimum involves an equalization of all consumptions across
individuals and across periods. Regarding optimal fertility timing, the FOC is exactly the same
as under the laissez-faire. Therefore, we have, for each type of agent, three distinct cases, and, in
total, six possibilities. As under the laissez-faire, we also have that, under general conditions
23 For the sake of simplicity, we will also assume, in the rest of this article; that the time preference factor b and the
interest factor R are equal to 1.
24 On this, see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005).
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(i.e., excluding Cases 2-2 and 3-3), it is socially optimal that type-2 agents have their children
later than type-1 agents. Hence, we have, at the social optimum
na1wna2
n‘1vn‘2
Comparing the utilitarian optimum with the laissez-faire, it appears that, on the
consumption side, the two allocations are quite different: Whereas type-2 agents enjoy higher
consumptions than type-1 agents at the laissez-faire, utilitarianism recommends the
equalization of consumptions across individuals and time periods. But on the fertility side,
given that the socially optimal timing of births is characterized by the same optimality
conditions as under the laissez-faire, and given that those conditions are independent from
consumption levels (because of separability), all agents keep, at the social optimum, the same
fertility profile as at the laissez-faire. However, as a result of consumption equalization, type-1
agents are better off at the utilitarian optimum in comparison to the laissez-faire, whereas the
opposite holds for type-2 agents.
Regarding the decentralization of the social optimum, this can be achieved by means of
lump-sum transfers from type-2 agents toward type-1 agents, in such a way as to equalize all
consumptions. Given that the optimal timing of births is, for both agents, independent from the
resource level, those transfers leave the fertility timing unchanged.
4. Family Allowances
The previous section showed how the first-best optimum can be decentralized by means of
lump-sum transfers from individuals with a high earnings profile toward individuals with a low
earnings profile. However, such an intervention requires both that lump-sum transfers are
available policy instruments and that the government can observe the types of individuals.
These are strong assumptions. In this section we depart from such a first-best problem and
consider instead the design of the second-best policies.
For that purpose, we will proceed in two stages. We will first focus on the optimal policy
when the only available fiscal instruments are uniform (i.e., nonindividualized) payroll taxes,
demogrants, and children allowances. Then, we will consider the optimal policy with
asymmetric information, under nonlinear fiscal instruments.
Linear Case
Let us first consider the government’s problem when the set of available policy
instruments does not include type-specific lump-sum transfers, but includes only a uniform
payroll tax, t; a uniform demogrant, T ; and a uniform subsidy on the number of children, s,
which can be understood as a family allowance.25
25 Note that other fiscal instruments could be used instead, but we focus here on those three instruments, in order to keep
the analysis simple. See section 5 for the study of the optimal pension benefit in the context of varying childbearing
age.
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Each agent of type i [ 1,2f g maximizes
Ui~u cið Þzu dið Þzu bið Þ{mi cizdizbi{T{ 1{tð Þ½
w 1zhi naið Þð Þz 1{sð Þ ea{e‘ð Þnaize‘ð Þ:
where mi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the agent’s budget constraint. The FOCs are
u
0
cið Þ~u0 dið Þ~u0 bið Þ~mi
{ 1{tð Þwh0i naið Þz 1{sð Þ ea{e‘ð Þ~0
Thus agents tend, here again, to smooth consumption across periods and organize the timing of
births in such a way as to equalize the marginal welfare losses and marginal welfare gains from
early parenthood.
As to the government, its goal is to maximize the sum of individual utilities subject to its




1{tð Þw 1zhi naið Þ)zT{ 1{sð Þ( ea{e‘ð Þnaize‘ð Þ
3
 
zm tw 1zhi naið Þð Þ{T{s ea{e‘ð Þnaizse‘½ g
where m is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint.







xið Þw 1zhi naið Þð Þ{mw 1zhi naið Þð Þ{mtwh0i naið Þ
Lnai
Lt
































1{tð Þw 1zhi naið Þ)zT{ 1{sð Þ( ea{e‘ð Þnaize‘ð Þ
3
is the argument of the agent i’s
temporal utility u(:).
Those conditions characterize the optimal values for our instruments t, s, and T . Note,
however, that the simultaneous study of the optimal levels of the three taxation tools would be
quite laborious, as their values are related to each others through the government’s budget
constraint. Hence, to keep the analysis simple, we will proceed as follows. To interpret those
optimality conditions, we will consider alternative pairs of instruments, holding the other
instrument equal to 0. Hence, we will focus on the pairs t,Tð Þ and s,Tð Þ, while keeping, each
time, the other fiscal tool set to zero. This will allow us to derive, in fine, closed-form solutions
for the optimal levels of the fiscal instruments.
Let us start with the pair t,Tð Þ, composed of a payroll tax on labor earnings and a first-period
demogrant. The first FOC from above does not suffice, on its own, to characterize the optimal level
of t, as a rise in t must, under the government’s budget constraint, imply a change in the
394 Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere
demogrant T , in such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium. Therefore, in order to
characterize the optimal t, we will use a compensated Lagrangian expression, whose derivative
with respect to the policy instrument t gives us the effect of a variation of t on the Lagrangian when
that change is compensated by a variation of T that keeps the government’s budget balanced.

















E w 1zh nað Þð Þ½ 
where eL denotes the compensated Lagrangian, andwhere the second term of the RHS accounts for
the effect of a change in the tax rate t on the first-period demogrant T , under the government’s
budget equilibrium constraint. The operator E(:) denotes the average value of its argument among
the population.26









E w 1zh nað Þð Þ½ 
~{E u
0











nað Þzs e‘{eað Þ is the effect of na on the revenue constraint (the first term is











denotes the effect of a change in t on
early fertility, when that change is compensated by a change in T so as to maintain the budget
equilibrium.
Regarding the pair s,Tð Þ, one can proceed in the same way as with the pair t,Tð Þ and

















ea{e‘ð ÞE nað Þ{e‘½ 
where the second term is the effect of a change in s on the demogrant, under the government’s
budget equilibrium.









ea{e‘ð ÞE nað Þ{e‘½ 
26 In the following, we drop the type index i when using the expectation operator.
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denotes the effect of a change in s on early fertility when that
change is compensated by a change in T in such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium.
The two compensated Lagrangian conditions can be rewritten as
{cov u
0











ea{e‘ð ÞzmE A L~naLs
 
~0
To interpret these tax formulae, we look at pairs of instruments: t and T and s and T . Then we
























Regarding the optimal payroll tax, note first that the numerator of (Equation 6) is positive, as
the covariance is negative, the correlation between x and h nað Þ being positive, given h0 nað Þv0: This
is the standard equity term of the tax formula. However, the sign of t depends also on that of the
denominator, whose sign depends on the one of{L~na=Lt: If the (aggregate) compensated effect of
the tax on na is negative, then the tax has a favorable impact on aggregate earnings and is thus
desirable. This is the efficiency term of the tax formula. On the contrary, if the (aggregate)
compensated effect of t on na is positive, the denominator is negative, implying a negative optimal t.
As far as optimal family allowances are concerned, the numerator of (Equation7) is
positive (low-income agents have early children). The equity term of the fiscal formula pushes
toward the subsidization of children. We thus have positive child benefits if the denominator is
also positive, that is, if those children benefits have a positive (aggregate) effect on early
childbearing in compensated terms.
In sum, the optimal policy consists, in the absence of lump-sum transfers, in a subsidization
of children, to the extent that such family allowances increase early parenthood. However, if
subsidizing children reduces early parenthood, then family allowances are no longer justified, and
a taxation of children is required instead. The intuition is the following. If subsidizing children
fosters early parenthood, this means, given that early parenthood concerns generally the
individuals with a low earnings profile, that family allowances are a way to redistribute resources
in the right direction (i.e., individuals with a low earnings profile), by subsidizing a good that
those agents consume more than others. Inversely, if subsidizing children reduces early
parenthood and raises late parenthood, family allowances are regressive, since these amount to
subsidizing a good that is mostly consumed by individuals with a high earnings profile.
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Note that, as an alternative to this presentation, we could replace the general children
subsidy s by a subsidy sa on early childbearing only.
27 Under such a refined instrument,
children would be subsidized differently, according to the age of their parents. In that case, the











where L~na=Lsa is the effect, on early fertility, of a change in sa compensated by a change in T in
such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium. The compensated effect L~na=Lsa is positive,
leading to a subsidy on early children.
Hence, the availability of children allowances differentiated according to the age of
parents would be an indirect way to redistribute resources toward agents with a low earnings
profile, who are usually the ones who have early children. The reason why governments can
use children allowances differentiated according to the age of parents in order to achieve
redistribution toward low-earning individuals lies in the differentiated fertility profiles
adopted by the two types of agents: Early childbearing concerns much more type-1 agents
than type-2 agents. Hence subsidizing children from young parents only is an indirect way to
redistribute resources toward type-1 agents in a second-best world.
Although the implementation of family allowances differentiated according to the parents’
age would not generate large administrative costs (since the age of parents is easy to observe), the
implementation of such differentiated family allowances would nonetheless face some other
difficulties, which lie on the political economy side. Clearly, family allowances differentiated
according to the age of parents would face the same kind of criticisms as other age-differentiated
fiscal policies (e.g., age-differentiated income taxation). The reason is that age is often regarded as
a characteristic that should not be used by the state to treat its citizens differently. Therefore the
implementation, in practice, of such differentiated family allowances would face strong criticisms,
and governments may be reluctant to use that policy instrument.28
Having said this, it should nonetheless be stressed that, as shown in this subsection, standard
family allowances—that is, not differentiated according to the age of parents—can also, under
mild conditions, be used to achieve indirect redistribution toward low earnings profile agents
(even though the redistribution would be better achieved by differentiated family allowances).
The reason why those undifferentiated family allowances can be used to achieve redistribution
lies in their capacity to raise early fertility, which concerns more type-1 agents than type-2 agents.
Thus standard, undifferentiated, family allowances can also, provided these raise early fertility,
achieve redistribution toward the low earnings profile individuals in a second-best setting.
Nonlinear Case
Let us now turn to an alternative formulation of the second-best problem, where the
available fiscal instruments are not restricted to linear (uniform) instruments, but where the
government cannot observe the types of agents. In that alternative framework, the government
27 In that case, there is no tax nor subsidy on late childbearing.
28 Note, however, that most tax systems implicitly differentiate people according to age through consumption taxation,
tax breaks for young workers, early retirement schemes, etc.
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cannot distinguish between, on the one hand, low-earnings-profile agents (i.e., type 1), and, on
the other hand, high-earnings-profile agents (i.e., type 2).
The problem for an individual of type i is to maximize
u cið Þzu dið Þzu bið Þ{mi cizdizbi{w 1zhi naið Þð Þznai ea{e‘ð Þze‘½
This implies ci~di~bi, so that the utility can be reduced to
Q w 1zhi naið Þð Þ{nai ea{e‘ð Þ{e‘zTi½ 
where Q :ð Þ denotes the agent’s lifetime welfare (Q0 (:)w0, Q00 (:)v0), whereas Ti denotes a lump-
sum transfer such that
P
piTi~0:
Remember that, for a given level of nai, we assume h2 naið Þwh1 naið Þ with h02 naið Þ
 w h01 naið Þ .
Hence, if the difference between h2 :ð Þ and h1 :ð Þ is large enough, type-1 agents will choose a very
high value of na1, and type-2 agents choose a lower level of na2 and will postpone childbearing.
As we showed above, the first-best optimum involves a perfect equalization of
consumptions for all agents and all periods, unlike at the laissez-faire. Hence, the
decentralization of the first-best optimum requires a transfers scheme, from type-2 agents
toward type-1 agents, namely, T1w0wT2.
In the second-best, the central planner cannot observe the types of agents. Hence, it is
tempting, for an agent of type 2, that is, with a high earnings profile, to pretend to be of type 1
(by adopting his childbearing pattern), in such a way as to benefit from public transfers T1wT2.
Therefore, the social planner must make sure that type-2 agents do not mimic type-1 agents.
This leads us to the self-selection constraint:
Q w 1zh2 na2ð Þð Þzna2 e‘{eað Þ{e‘zT2½ §
Q w 1zh2 na1ð Þð Þzna1 e‘{eað Þ{e‘zT1½ : ð9Þ
The second-best problem can be written by means of the Lagrangian:
L~
X
pi Q w 1zhi naið Þð Þznai e‘{eað Þ{e‘zTið Þ{cTif g
zlfQ w 1zh2 na2ð Þð Þzna2 e‘{eað Þ{e‘zT2ð Þ{Q w 1zh2 na1ð Þð Þzna1 e‘{eað Þ{e‘zT1ð Þg
where c is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint on lump-sum transfers,
whereas l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint. The FOCs are
na1 : p1Q
0













2 na2ð Þz e‘{eað Þ
h i
~0
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x1ð ÞwcwQ0 x2ð Þ
In other words, in the choice of na2, one has the standard ‘‘nondistortion at the top’’ result. As
to redistribution, it is only partial, since we have x2wx1. Thus, the presence of asymmetric
information prevents the equalization of lifetime welfare across types, unlike in the first-best
optimum.











2 na1ð Þz e‘{eað Þ
h i
When comparing that condition with the one at the laissez-faire, that is, e‘{ea~{wh
0
1(na1),
it appears that the above condition includes an additional term on the RHS, which is of positive
sign. In the light of that comparison, it follows that, in order to decentralize the second-best
optimum, one should have a subsidy on na1, in such a way as to relax the self-selection constraint.
Indeed, given that early children are more important for agents of type 1 in comparison to agents
of type 2 (for whom early childbearing has worse effects on the earnings profile), a simple way to
prevent type-2 agents from pretending to be of type 1 to get transfers consists of subsidizing early
births for those who declare themselves being of type 1, and not for others. As type-2 agents are
less interested in early childbearing in comparison to type-1 agents, such a family allowance
scheme would allow governments to induce the self-selection of agents: Only true type-1 agents
will, under those family allowances, claim to be of type 1.
Hence the optimal policy under asymmetric information involves children allowances on
children of young parents and that are differentiated according to the parents’ earnings profiles.
The intuition behind that result lies in the fact that, even if an individual earnings profile is hard
to observe, the age at which one has children is actually observable, and the government can use
the fact that type-2 agents are less interested in early fertility than type-1 agents in order to
induce those agents to reveal their true type. Thus, even if the government cannot observe the
earnings of agents, it can nonetheless insure the self-selection of types by proposing different
children allowances, which make, by construction, any mimicking suboptimal for individuals.29
29 Note that, here again, as in section 4, governments may, in practice, be reluctant to apply such differentiated family
allowances, on the ground of a will to treat all individuals equally. But the problem with such reluctance is that it turns
out, at the end of the day, to prevent redistribution toward the worst-off agents. This issue is identical to that found in
the tagging literature.
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5. Childbearing and PAYG Social Security
Up to now, we studied the optimal family policy under a perfect capital market. We will
now relax that assumption. For that purpose, we will assume that the only way individuals can
provide resources for their old age is through a contract such that when retired they get a
fraction of their children’s earnings.
Such a contract can take various forms. It can be a standard Pay-As-You-Go pension
system (PAYG), which provides a pension to the elderly thanks to the contributions of the
young active individuals. It can also take the form of intergenerational trade within the
(extended) family, each active child giving some fraction of his income to the inactive elderly in
his family. Moreover, the system can be an individualized system, where parents internalize the
effect of their fertility choices on retirement benefits, or, alternatively, a collective system, where
parents can free-ride on the system (either PAYG or familial) to get large pensions without
supporting the cost of fertility.
As we shall see, relaxing the perfect capital market assumption and replacing it by a
pension system is not neutral at all for the design of the optimal family allowances in the
context of endogenous childbearing ages. The reason is that, once a (formal or informal)
pension system is introduced, there might be, for parents, an incentive in having early children.
The reasons are twofold. First, children, if born a longer time ago, can, under increasing
earnings profiles, provide higher pensions to their parents. Second, and more importantly,
when parents with early children are retired, they can rely not on one, but on two, generations
of workers: their own children and their grandchildren.
To illustrate this, we will, first, for the sake of presentation, study fertility choices under an
individualized pension system, when there is only one type of agent. We will then reintroduce
heterogeneity later in this section.
Optimal Policy with One Type
In that context, the problem faced by an individual amounts to choosing savings sa, early
children na, and contribution rate c to maximize:
30
U~u 1{cð Þw{eana{sa½ zu 1{cð Þwh nað Þ{(1{na)e‘zsa½ 
zu c w(1{na)zwh nað Þnazwnanað Þ½ 
where c is the fraction of earnings that is paid to the elderly, while na means that the individual
expects his early children to have the same number of early children as himself (i.e., na), without
having any control on it. Note that the earnings’ basis available for the funding of the elderly’s
pensions includes three terms: The first two terms (i.e., w 1{nað Þ and wh nað Þna) concern the
incomes from the late and the early children, whereas the third term, that is, wnana, concerns the
income of grandchildren, whose number is nana (as each na early child had also na early children
once an adult). The FOCs are
sa : u
0
cð Þ~u0 dð Þ ð10Þ
30 To keep things simple, we assume that savings between the first and the second periods is possible.
400 Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere
c : u
0
cð Þ~u0 bð Þ 1{nazh nað Þnaznana
1zh nað Þ ð11Þ
na : u
0




bð Þc {wzwh nað Þzwnað Þ ð12Þ
In a world of identical individuals, these three conditions lead to the optimal decision
concerning sa, na, and c as long as each individual considers that the pension scheme operates at
the level of the family. It is interesting to observe that such a PAYG scheme creates a distortion
in favor of early childbearing, relative to a setting of a fully funded pension system. The reason
is that early children have higher earnings when their parents retire, and that they have
themselves some working children, unlike the parents’ late children.
If, instead of that individualized pension system, the PAYG scheme were collective, each
agent would not, when making his fertility timing choice, perceive his impact on pension benefits.
Hence, agents would choose a lower number of early births. To see this, note that, under collective
pensions, conditions (Equation 10) and (Equation 11) would be unchanged, but conditions
(Equation 12) would become
u
0
cð Þ ea{ 1{cð Þwh0 nað Þ{e‘
h i
~0 ð129Þ
Given that the RHS of (Equation 12) includes an additional positive term in comparison to
(Equation 12), agents have, under a collective pensions system, fewer early children—and thus
more late children—than under an individualized system.
Therefore, in order to induce the optimal fertility behavior under a collective system, one
would need a Pigouvian subsidy sa on early children, such that






Subsidizing children is standard in economies with PAYG pensions system and endogenous
fertility (see Gahvari 2009): Individuals do not internalize the effect that their fertility choice
can have on pension benefits, and a subsidy can induce parents to have the right number of
children. The specificity of the present approach is that the subsidization does not concern all
births (which are here constant, since naizn‘i~1), but only children born from young parents.
The reason why such a differentiated subsidization of children is needed is twofold.
First, under h nað Þw1, the levels of earnings of contributors born from young parents are larger
than the earnings of contributors born from older parents, since only the former can benefit from
increasing productivity along the career. Second, the number of contributors is strongly affected by early
fertility decisions, through the number of grandchildren. On the other hand, in the case of late
parenthood, grandchildren cannot fund the pension system, and so the fertility externality is less sizeable.
Those arguments justify a differentiated fiscal treatment of early and late parenthoods,
under the form of children allowances that depend on the age of parents: saw0~s‘.31 Thus,
even if one assumes a perfect homogeneity of the population in terms of career opportunity and
31 Here again, governments may be reluctant to treat different births differently, depending on the age of parents.
However, if the goal of the policy is to internalize externalities, the two reasons mentioned above legitimate a
subsidization that encourages early births and discourages late births, on the ground of their distinct external effects
for pensions funding.
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earnings profile, there is already a strong argument not only for subsidizing children, but also
for subsidizing them differently depending on the age of their parents, in the sense that only
early births should be subsidized. The justification is that fertility externalities induced by early
and late fertility are not of the same magnitudes, inviting a differentiated fiscal treatment.32
Optimal Policy under Two Types
Let us now turn back to the case when individuals differ in their future earnings
opportunities (i.e., the function hi naið Þ). Given that children allowances differentiated according
to the age of parents have been already studied above, we will abstract here from these and
assume that the available fiscal instruments are a uniform child benefit of rate s, a payroll tax
t, and flat rate PAYG pension p.
When agents smooth their consumption over the active period, the lifetime welfare for an
agent of type i is
Ui~2u




where the pension benefit is, under a balanced government budget, equal to
p~
X
pi tw 1{naizhi naið Þnaizn2ai

 
{s eanaize‘ 1{naið Þð Þ
 
Each individual i[f1,2g chooses nai without seeing the effect his choice has on his future
pension benefits. His choice of nai is determined by the FOC:
u
0
cið Þ w 1{tð Þh0i naið Þ{ 1{sð Þ ea{e‘ð Þ
h i
~0
That condition does not yield the socially optimal level of early children, since this neglects the
impact of early fertility on old-age pensions p through its impact on the budget constraint of the
economy. That point is similar to the one made in the one-type reduced model studied in
section 5.




pi Ui{m pzs eanaize‘ 1{naið Þð Þ{tw 1{naizhi naið Þnaizn2ai
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where m is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s budget constraint. Using












cð Þw 1zh nað Þð Þ
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32 Note, however, that we focus here, as above, on a static economy, and that the study of the optimal family allowances
could give significantly different results in a dynamic economy. In a dynamic setting, the impact of fertility timing on
the existence, at the laissez-faire, of a stable stationary equilibrium is studied in Pestieau and Ponthiere (2013).





cð Þ na ea{e‘ð Þ{e‘½ 
h i
{mE eanaze‘ 1znað Þð Þð Þ{mE B LnaLs
 
~0
where B:s ea{e‘ð Þ{tw {1zh nað Þznah0 nað Þz2na

 
denotes the effect of na on the budget
constraint. A marginal increase in early fertility na has four revenue effects: (i) a revenue
increase thanks to lower child cost (i.e., as eave‘); (ii) a revenue loss, since h
0
nað Þv0 (due to the
productivity loss induced by early childbearing); (iii) another revenue gain as h nað Þw1 (thanks
to the larger contributions of the children once older and more productive); (iv) and another
revenue gain through grandchildren (which is linear in the number of early children). A






. Substituting for m in the second and
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Together, those optimality conditions characterize the optimal values of p, t, and s. Note,
however, that the joint study of the optimal levels of those three tax instruments would be quite
laborious, since their values are all linked (through the government’s budget constraint).
Therefore, for the sake of presentation, we will, as above, consider successively the pairs t, pð Þ
and s, pð Þ, while keeping, each time, the other fiscal tool set to zero.
Let us start with the pair t, pð Þ, that is, only a payroll tax and a pension are available









pð Þ{u0 cð Þ













 	  ð14Þ
That formula defines the optimal level of the payroll tax t when the proceeds are used to fund a
pension system only. The numerator consists of three terms that are all expected to be positive
(assuming that E u
0
pð Þ{u0 cð Þ
 w0). Hence those three terms push toward more redistribution
through the income tax. The denominator gives the effect of the tax on public revenue. The sign
of this efficiency effect depends on the impact of earnings taxation on aggregate early fertility
(i.e., E Lna=Ltð Þ), and on the impact of aggregate early fertility on the government’s budget
constraint. If the impact of t on the aggregate early fertility is negative (i.e., E Lna=Ltð Þv0),








Þ, the efficiency effect is also positive. As a consequence, the optimal tax is most
likely to be positive: tw0.
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Turning now to the pair s, pð Þ, under the assumption t~0, equalizing the above FOCs to
0 yields33
s~





pð Þ{u0 cð Þ
 
e‘{eað ÞEu0 pð ÞE LnaLs
: ð15Þ
Assume that type-1 have more early children than type-2. Assume further that child allowances
have a positive effect on na (i.e., E Lna=Lsð Þw0). Then the optimal s depends on the relative
strength of the two terms of the numerator. On the one hand, the positive covariance term pushes
for a highs and a low p. If the poor tend to havemore early children, the equity term pushes toward
a less negative s, as a way to achieve indirect redistribution toward type-1 agents. That effect is
increasing in the cost differential between late and early childbearing, e‘{ea. On the other hand, the
positive term Eu
0
pð Þ{Eu0 cð Þ pushes toward a more negative s aimed at financing the pension
scheme. Hence, the level of the optimal s depends on the strengths of those two terms. Finally, the
denominator gives the impact of s on fiscal revenues, through its effect on the timing of births.34
In sum, once we reintroduce heterogeneity in terms of earnings profile, the optimal family
policy requires an arbitrage between equity and efficiency. Given that agents with lower future
earnings tend to have children earlier, the subsidization of fertility is supported by equity
concerns. The cost gap between late and early fertility tends to reinforce that equity case for
children allowances. However, a higher cost gap between late and early childbearing pushes, from
an efficiency point of view, toward lower family allowances. Hence, the observed falling cost gap
between late and early childbearing has an ambiguous effect on the optimal family policy.
6. Extensions
This section considers several extensions of the baseline model. First, an alternative
modeling of parental preferences, where children are durable goods; second, the introduction of
an education decision; third, the addition of a third working period; and, fourth, the
introduction of varying total fertility.35
Children as Durable Goods
Throughout the article; parental lifetime welfare has taken a simple form, where there is a
perfect substitutability between early and late births. That assumption, although analytically
convenient, neglects the status of children as durable goods, which can be ‘‘consumed’’ during
more than a single period. In the present context, the idea of durable goods amounts to
introducing a qualitative difference between children born at different points in time: their
differentiated capacity to increase their parents’ welfare.
Let us now assume that children are durable goods, so that parental lifetime welfare now
depends on the duration of coexistence with the children:
33 Note that fixing t~0 does not cause any problem of funding for the government, since s or p can take a negative
value, so as to bring the government’s budget equilibrium. Given that p is the only resource in retirement, s has to be
negative. In other words, pension benefits are financed by a tax on children, which is in the spirit of a PAYG scheme.
34 Indeed the timing of births is not neutral for the government’s budget, as the cost of children depends on the timing of
births, since eave‘.
35 Because of space constraints, we focus, for each extension, on the comparison of the laissez-faire and the first-best with the
corresponding ones under the baseline model, but do not formally explore the design of the optimal second-best policy.
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Ui~u cið Þzu dið Þzu bið Þz3v naið Þz2v(1{nai) ð16Þ
The intuition behind expression (Equation 16) is that the nai children born when parents are in
period 1 will be ‘‘enjoyed’’ during three periods, while the n‘i children born later on will only be
‘‘enjoyed’’ during two periods. The FOCs become
u
0












In the FOC for optimal fertility, there are now two additional terms on the RHS: On the one
hand, a larger number of early children generates a welfare gain during the entire lifecycle
(second term of the RHS), but, at the same time, it reduces the welfare gain associated with late










Comparing this FOC with the one in the baseline model e‘{ea~{wh
0
i(nai) shows that a central
difference is that the optimal fertility timing depends here on the level of consumption, through
u
0
cið Þ. Given u00 cið Þv0, viewing children as durable goods especially affects our results when
consumption is high.
If one focuses only on the interior solution, the comparison of the fertility profile with the
one under the baseline model can be carried out as follows. Given that 3v
00
naið Þz2v00 1{naið Þv0
and that 3v
0
0ð Þ{2v0 1ð Þw0, the additional term is negative at nai~0 and increasing in nai.
Therefore the addition of that term has an ambiguous effect on nai.
36 Additional restrictions
on the function v(:) are needed to know the effect with certainty. If, for instance,
3v
0
naið Þ{2v0 1{naið Þw0 for any 0vnaiv1, then the added term is negative, so that treating
children as durable goods raises the number of early births nai.
Regarding the comparison of the two types, the additional term in the RHS of the FOC is,
ceteris paribus, larger, in absolute value, for type-2 agents than for type-1 agents when type-2
agents have a higher consumption.37 Hence taking children as durable goods affects the fertility
profile of type-2 more significantly than the one of type 1. If 3v
0
naið Þ{2v0 1{naið Þw0 for any
nai, nai is increased for all agents, and to a larger extent for type-2 agents. But this modeling
does not, in general, lead to an inversion of the fertility profiles across types. If the differential
in terms of earnings sensitivity is sufficiently large, we still have na1wna2 and n‘1vn‘2, as in the
baseline model.
The first-best optimum is obtained by maximizing the following Lagrangian:X
pi Ui{m cizdizbiznaieaz(1{nai)e‘{w 1zhi naið Þð Þ½ ð Þ
where m denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint of the
economy. The FOCs are
36 The reason is that it reduces the RHS for low levels of nai , and it raises the RHS for high ones, so that the chosen nai
may be higher or lower in comparison to the baseline model.
37 This case is plausible, given their higher lifetime earnings (whatever their fertility is).
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u
0










The first-best involves, as in the baseline model, an equalization of consumptions for all agents
and all periods. But an important difference is that the socially optimal fertility timing is now
dependent on consumption profiles. Therefore, the equalization of consumption profiles across
all individuals has here some impact on optimal fertility profiles, unlike in the baseline model.
Type-1 agents have a higher consumption profile than at the laissez-faire, whereas the opposite
holds for type-2. Assuming 3v
0
naið Þ{2v0 1{naið Þw0 for any 0vnaiv1, the optimal na1 is higher
than at the laissez-faire, whereas the optimal na2 is lower.
The first-best can be decentralized by means of lump-sum transfers, from type-2 toward
type-1 agents. Those transfers, by equalizing u
0
(ci) across agents, also affect the fertility timing
within each group, in the direction mentioned above. When such transfers are not available, the
decentralization of the second-best can be studied, by means of linear fiscal tools, in line with
section 4. Under that alternative modeling, family allowances can still be justified when early
children remain mostly consumed by type-1 agents, provided such allowances increase early
fertility. Depending on whether the rise in nai is larger for type-2 or for type-1 agents, the
optimal level of family allowances may be reduced or increased in comparison to the baseline
model. Thus viewing children as durable goods can—at least quantitatively—affect the optimal
family policy.
Education
So far, our study has relied on a model where agents differ in terms of their earnings
profiles, because of unexplained reasons. Such a modeling is a reduced form of the real world,
where wages differentials are not exogenous, but depend on past education choices. This
subsection explores, in a modified framework, the interactions between education choices and
fertility choices.
For that purpose, let us assume that individuals of type i can study a fraction ki of the first
period, and thus work a fraction 1{ki of the first period. That education brings a return in
period 2, where the total labor earnings is now
whi naið ÞBi kið Þ
where the return from education is Bi kið Þ~1zkaii , with 0va1va2v1, that is, type-2 agents
benefit from a higher elasticity of future earnings with respect to education.38 The agent’s
problem is now
max
ci ,di ,bi ,nai ,ki




The FOCs describing an interior optimum are
38 Note that Bi(0)~1, in conformity with the baseline model.
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u
0
cið Þ~u0 dið Þ~u0 bið Þ
e‘{ea~{wh
0
i naið ÞBi kið Þ
1~hi naið ÞB0i kið Þ
The education choice is described by the third FOC: The optimal education equalizes, at the
margin, the welfare loss due to education (LHS), with the welfare gain from education (RHS),
which is decreasing in nai. Note also that, since Bi kið Þw1, introducing education tends to
increase, ceteris paribus, the marginal cost from having early children (RHS of the second
FOC), implying a lower nai and a higher n‘i, in conformity with the literature emphasizing the
role of education as a cause of births postponement.
Regarding the comparison of the two types, education levels are given by39
h1 na1ð Þa1ka1{11 ~1~h2 na2ð Þa2ka2{12
which yields k1~ h1(na1)a1ð Þ
1
1{a1 and k2~ h2(na2)a2ð Þ
1








As h1 naið Þvh2 naið Þ, h01 naið Þ
 v h02 naið Þ  and a1va2, type-2 agents choose, in comparison to
type-1 agents, a lower number of early children and a higher education level, because of larger
gains from education for them.
The social planner’s problem can be written as the Lagrangian:X
pi Ui{m cizdizbiznaieaz(1{nai)e‘{w 1{kizhi naið ÞBi(ki)ð Þ½ ð Þ
where m denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. The FOCs are
u
0
cið Þ~u0 dið Þ~u0 bið Þ~m
e‘{ea~{wh
0
i naið ÞBi kið Þ
1~hi naið ÞB0i kið Þ
The first-best involves, here again, an equal consumption across agents and periods. As in the
baseline model, the first-best can be decentralized by means of lump-sum transfers, from type-2
toward type-1 agents. Those transfers do not affect fertility timing and education decisions. If
the only available fiscal tools are a linear tax on earnings and a linear subsidy on births, the
decentralization of the second-best can be achieved by means of a positive subsidy on births
(provided it raises early fertility), on the same redistributive grounds as under the baseline
model. Hence our results are robust to introducing education.40
39 For the sake of presentation, we focus here only on interior solutions.
40 Note, however, that if one adds a tax on education as an alternative fiscal tool, then the fact that type-2 agents tend to
choose a higher education can justify, in a second-best world, a positive tax on education, on the same redistributive
grounds.
Childbearing Age and Social Security 407
A Third Working Period
The baseline model exhibits an asymmetry between early births and late births: Whereas
early births affect future earnings opportunities, late births did not have such an effect. To
evaluate the robustness of our results to relaxing that asymmetry, let us now consider a four-
period model. As above, periods 1 and 2 are periods of labor, consumption, and childbearing,
and the last period (now period 4) is a period of retirement. But we add an intermediate period
of labor (period 3), during which labor earnings depend negatively on fertility at the previous
period. Thus the wage profile is now w in period 1, whi naið Þ in period 2, and whi(nai)½ Hi ni‘ð Þ in







 v H 02(ni‘)  for an equal ni‘.
For an agent of type i [ 1,2f g, the problem becomes
max
ci ,di ,bi ,gi ,nai
u cið Þzu dið Þzu(bi)zu(gi)s:t:
wzwhi naið Þzwhi naið ÞHi 1{naið Þ
~ciznaieazdiz(1{nai)e‘zbizgi

where gi denotes consumption in period 4. The FOCs describing an interior optimum are
u
0





i naið ÞHi 1{naið Þzwhi naið ÞH
0
i 1{naið Þ
In the FOC for nai, we now have two additional terms on the RHS. The term
{wh
0
i naið ÞHi 1{naið Þ gives us the marginal cost of early children in terms of reduced earnings
in period 3. That term is of positive sign. The second additional term, whi naið ÞH 0i 1{naið Þ, is of
negative sign. It consists of the marginal cost due to postponing births, that is, reduced earnings
in period 3. When the first additional term dominates (resp. is dominated by) the second one,
the marginal cost of having early children is increased (resp. reduced) in comparison to the
baseline model, which pushes, ceteris paribus, toward fewer (resp. more) early births and more
(resp. fewer) late births.41












2 na2ð ÞH2 1{na2ð Þzwh2 na2ð ÞH
0
2 1{na2ð Þ
For an equal nai, the first and the second terms of the RHS are larger for type-2 than for type-1,
while the third term is smaller (i.e., more negative). Therefore, unlike in the baseline model, the
comparison of fertility profiles gives here ambiguous results, and additional assumptions
are needed to draw some conclusions. If, for instance, we have, for any equal nai:
{wh
0
1 naið ÞH1 1{naið Þzwh1 naið ÞH
0
1 1{naið Þ v{wh
0
2 naið ÞH2 1{naið Þzwh2 naið ÞH
0
2 1{naið Þ, then
na1wna2 and n‘1vn‘2, so that the qualitative results of the baseline model would still prevail,
but the differential between the two fertility profiles may vary. If H
0
i 1{naið Þ&0, the early
fertility gap between the two types of agents would be even larger than in the baseline model,
because of the cumulative effect of early births on earnings during two working periods (instead
41 For the sake of presentation, we assume here an interior solution.
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of one). It would only be under a highly negative H
0
i 1{naið Þ that the results of the baseline
model would be inverted. In general, we still have na1wna2 and n‘1vn‘2. The differential
between the two fertility profiles may even be larger here, under large cumulative earnings loss
due to early fertility.
The social planner’s problem can be written by means of the Lagrangian:
X
pi Ui{m cizdizbizgiznaieaz(1{nai)e‘{w 1zhi naið Þzhi naið ÞH(1{nai)ð Þ½ ð Þ









i naið ÞHi 1{naið Þzwhi naið ÞH
0
i 1{naið Þ
Thus the first-best optimum involves, here again, an equalization of consumptions across
agents and periods. As in the baseline model, the first-best social optimum can be
decentralized by means of lump-sum transfers, from type-2 agents toward type-1 agents. At
the second-best, and focusing on linear fiscal instruments (as in section 4), positive family
allowances are still justified here, to the extent that these raise the consumption of a good that
is mostly consumed by low earnings profile agents: early children. Thus our results are, at
least qualitatively, robust to the introduction of a third working period.
Varying Total Fertility
To conclude this section, let us now consider an alternative fertility decision, where parents
choose not only the timing of births, but, also, the total number of children naizn‘i, which is no
longer fixed to unity. Under that alternative environment, the problem of an individual of type
i [f1,2g is
max
ci ,di ,bi ,nai ,n‘i

















dið Þe‘zv0 naizn‘ið Þ~0




42 For simplicity, we focus here only on the interior optimum, with naiw0 and ni‘w0.
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Regarding the interior optimal n‘i, this is determined by the condition
u
0
dið Þe‘~v0 naizn‘ið Þ




 w h01 naið Þ , it follows from e‘{ea~{wh0i naið Þ that na1wna2. Regarding late births, we
know from the above condition that type-2 agents, who benefit from larger consumption
possibilities, exhibit a lower u
0
dið Þ than type-1 agents and, thus, a lower LHS in the FOC for n‘i.
Regarding the RHS, we have na1wna2, which leads to v
0
na1zn‘ið Þvv0 na2zn‘ið Þ for an equal n‘i.
Given that the LHS is smaller for type-2, and that the RHS is larger for type-2 ceteris paribus, it
must be the case that n‘1vn‘2. In total, given that na1wna2 and n‘1vn‘2, it is not obvious to see
which type of agent has the largest total fertility. But we know for sure that the fertility profile
differs across types. The previous results are thus robust to relaxing naizn‘i~1.
The first-best optimum is obtained by maximizing the Lagrangian:
X
pi Ui{m cizdizbiznaieazn‘ie‘{w 1zhi naið Þð Þ½ ð Þ
where m denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Assuming
interior solutions, the FOCs are
u
0
cið Þ~u0 dið Þ~u0 bið Þ~m
v
0





The utilitarian social optimum involves an equalization of all consumptions across individuals





That equality characterizes the optimal nai. It is the same as in the laissez-faire. This is not true




since the equalization of consumptions affects u
0
(di). As a consequence, and still focusing on an
interior social optimum, we obtain that type-1 agents enjoy, at the social optimum, a higher
consumption profile than at the laissez-faire, and the opposite is true for type-2 agents.
Regarding fertility, whereas both types of agents should have, at the social optimum, the same
level of nai as in the laissez-faire, type-2 agents should have fewer late children n‘2 than at the
laissez-faire, whereas type-1 agents should have a higher n‘1 than at the laissez-faire. Therefore
the total fertility naizn‘i of type-1 is higher than at the laissez-faire, whereas this is reduced for
type-2.
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The decentralization of the first-best can be achieved by means of lump-sum transfers
from type-2 toward type-1 agents, so as to equalize all consumptions. Such transfers, by
reducing the marginal utility of consumption for type-1 agents, raise n‘1 above its laissez-faire
level. Inversely, those transfers tend to reduce n‘2, but without affecting early fertility. At the
second-best, and focusing on linear fiscal instruments, the decentralization of the optimum
involves positive family allowances provided these contribute to raise na1. The underlying
intuition is that such family allowances can be used a way to achieve redistribution toward the
low earnings profile individuals. Therefore our results are globally robust to relaxing the fixed
total fertility assumption.
7. Conclusion
As is widely acknowledged among demographers, European economies have been
characterized, during the last three decades, by a tendency toward the postponement of fertility.
Through its consequences on the economy as a whole, that demographic trend raises various
challenges to policymakers.
The present article aimed at examining the design of the optimal family policy in an
economy where the timing of births is chosen by individuals. For that purpose, we developed a
three-period model with replacement fertility, where fertility can take place during two—
instead of one—periods. The population was partitioned in two groups, who differ in the level
and slope of their earnings profile, which is decreasing in early fertility. That model can
replicate the observed differential of fertility timing across earnings groups.
Regarding the optimal public intervention, we firstly considered the first-best utilitarian
optimum, and showed that this can be decentralized by means of lump-sum transfers from
high-earnings toward low-earnings agents. Then, considering an economy where only linear
uniform policy instruments are available, we showed that the optimal second-best policy
involves a subsidy on early children, to the extent that it fosters early parenthood. Indeed, given
that early parenthood concerns generally parents with low earnings opportunities, family
allowances are justified on redistributive grounds. Children allowances differentiated according
to the parent’s age would, if available, achieve that redistribution even better. Turning then to
the optimal nonlinear policy under asymmetric information, we showed that only early children
from low earnings profile parents should be subsidized, to solve the self-selection problem.
We also investigated the impact of childbearing ages on the funding of social security, by
introducing, in our setup, a pension system. We showed, in a framework without heterogeneity,
that, under a collective pension system, the fertility externalities related to early and late
parenthoods differ significantly, inviting a positive Pigouvian subsidy for early children only.
The underlying reason is both qualitative (older children, under increasing productivity,
contribute more than younger, late children) and quantitative (early parents can, once retired,
benefit from the contributions of their grandchildren). Turning back to the 2-type case, we
showed that the social planner faces a trade-off between efficiency (favoring late childbearing)
and equity (helping early childbearing).
Finally, we also explored the robustness of our results to four distinct variations of the
model: first, parental preferences regarding children as durable consumption goods; second,
the introduction of education; third, the addition of a third working period; fourth, relaxing the
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replacement fertility assumption. Those extensions do not, in general, affect our results from a
qualitative perspective, since the fertility timing differential between agents is preserved. The
same robustness holds when characterizing the social optimum, and when studying its
decentralization under various sets of fiscal instruments.
In sum, the present study highlights major challenges faced by policymakers in the context
of endogenous childbearing ages. Endogenous childbearing age affects fundamental aspects of
the optimal policy design. As far as redistribution is concerned, the observed correlation
between the heterogeneity in terms of fertility age pattern and in terms of career opportunities
makes children allowances differentiated in terms of the age of parent socially desirable.
Moreover, the internalization of fertility externalities in the context of pensions funding would
also require children allowances differentiated according to the age of parents. Hence, even
though policy debates are usually concerned with changes in total fertility, the timing of births is
far from a detail for the design of the optimal family policy and, as such, will require more
attention in the future.
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